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HUMILITY, LISTENING AND  
‘TEACHING IN A STRONG SENSE’1 
Andrea R. ENGLISH 
 
ABSTRACT: My argument in this paper is that humility is implied in the concept of 
teaching, if teaching is construed in a strong sense. Teaching in a strong sense is a view 
of teaching as linked to students’ embodied experiences (including cognitive and moral-
social dimensions), in particular students’ experiences of limitation, whereas a weak 
sense of teaching refers to teaching as narrowly focused on student cognitive 
development. In addition to detailing the relation between humility and strong sense 
teaching, I will also argue that humility is acquired through the practice of teaching. My 
discussion connects to the growing interest, especially in virtue epistemology discourse, 
in the idea that teachers should educate for virtues. Drawing upon John Dewey and 
contemporary virtue epistemology discourse, I discuss humility, paying particular 
attention to an overlooked aspect of humility that I refer to as the educative dimension 
of humility. I then connect this concept of humility to the notion of teaching in a strong 
sense. In the final section, I discuss how humility in teaching is learned in the practice 
of teaching by listening to students in particular ways. In addition, I make connections 
between my concept of teaching and the practice of cultivating students’ virtues. I 
conclude with a critique of common practices of evaluating good teaching, which I 
situate within the context of international educational policy on teacher evaluation. 
KEYWORDS: humility, teaching, listening, John Dewey, virtue epistemology, 
teacher evaluation policy 
 
Must one have humility to teach? The answer to this question depends on what 
we mean by teaching. My argument in this paper is that humility is implied in the 
concept of teaching, if teaching is construed in a strong sense. Teaching in a strong 
sense is a view of teaching as linked to students’ embodied experiences (including 
cognitive and moral-social dimensions), in particular students’ experiences of 
limitation, whereas a weak sense of teaching refers to teaching as narrowly 
focused on student cognitive development. In addition to detailing the relation 
between humility and strong sense teaching, I will also argue that humility is 
acquired through the practice of teaching.  
                                                                
1 Parts of this paper were presented at the Workshop on Humility and Education, at the 
University of Edinburgh 2015, and at the American Educational Research Association Annual 
conference in Washington D.C. April 2016. 
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Common notions of teaching circulated in popular culture and implied in 
much of international educational policy can interfere with an understanding of 
teaching in a strong sense. Perhaps the most common notion of teaching arises 
from our deeply ingrained image of the teacher—routinely displayed in television, 
film and literature, and potentially recalled in our own schooling experiences—as 
that person standing in front of a classroom directly delivering content to students 
by talking at them as they sit quietly in rows at desks. Another idea that pervades 
common thinking is that to be a teacher merely requires some specialised subject 
knowledge. This image is promoted by popular programmes such as Teach for 
America or the UK’s Teach First—which entice university graduates to go directly 
into a classroom to teach for a few years, often as a mere stepping stone to more 
lucrative business management positions. More generally, there is a common view 
that teaching is not a profession in its own right, which adheres to principles and 
methods, but rather, is something one does when one cannot enter a real 
profession, hence the saying “those who can’t do, teach.” 
Attempts to get away from these common ideas of teaching have been made 
by educational theorists using more specialised notions of “good teaching.” 
However, talk of “good teaching” implies there is also something called “bad 
teaching.” But to call something “bad teaching” does not tell us what is bad about 
it. Is it bad because it does not lead to intended outcomes? Or is it because it does 
not engage learners in critical thinking in the classroom? Or is it because it 
involves offensive behaviours? Depending on why it is “bad” teaching, it may not 
actually deserve to be called teaching at all. For these reasons, I argue that we 
need to circumvent muddled and reified ideas of teaching, and also go beyond the 
qualifier “good” with reference to teaching by talking about what I will define as 
“teaching in a strong sense.”  
Certain virtues of the teacher are implied by the way I define teaching in a 
strong sense. Here, I will define it in terms of its relation to the virtue of humility. 
My discussion connects to the growing interest, especially in virtue epistemology 
discourse, in the idea that teachers should educate for virtues.2 Yet, the focus there 
has been on the question of what teachers should do to cultivate virtues in their 
                                                                
2 This is not only the subject of several publications in virtue epistemology (see e.g. Heather 
Battaly. “Teaching intellectual Virtues: Applying Virtue Epistemology in the Classroom,” 
Teaching Philosophy 29, 3 (2006): 191-222; and, Jason Baehr, “Educating for Intellectual 
Virtues: From Theory to Practice,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 47, 2 (2013): 248-262), 
but also of a number of international conferences, such as this year’s “Connecting Virtues: 
Theoretical and Educational Insights” which names “educating to the virtues” as a special 
conference theme, see http://connectingvirtuesconference.weebly.com/key-topics.html. 
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students. Less considered, however, is the question of what virtues are necessary 
for the teachers themselves to have in order to cultivate virtues in others. 
Only recently, this topic was addressed in an empirical study on “The Good 
Teacher: Understanding Virtues in Practice,” which asked student teachers, newly 
qualified teachers, and experienced teachers, to identify the six character strengths 
they believe best describe those of the “ideal teacher.”3 Of 546 teacher 
participants, none of them selected humility, despite this being an available option 
in the questionnaire.4 The report does not make clear why participants selected 
certain virtues over others. I suggest that one possible reason is that the 
participants differed in what concepts of teaching informed their selection of the 
virtues of the good teacher. The failure to include humility could suggest that they 
did not have a notion of teaching in the strong sense.5  What I seek to make clear 
in what follows is that the strong sense of teaching implies certain kinds of 
receptivity to others associated with humility.  
My argument unfolds in three steps. In part one, I discuss the concept of 
humility with reference to the work of John Dewey, Richard Paul and Dennis 
Whitcomb et al.’s recent discussion of intellectual humility. I pay particular 
attention to drawing out an overlooked aspect of humility that I refer to as the 
educative dimension of humility. In part two, I connect this concept of humility 
to the notion of teaching in a strong sense. In part three, I discuss how humility in 
teaching is learned in the practice of teaching by listening to students in particular 
ways. To close part three, I make some connections between my concept of 
teaching and the practice of cultivating students’ virtues. I conclude with a 
critique of common practices of evaluating good teaching to illuminate what I call 
the “hard problem” of teacher evaluation.  
                                                                
3 James Arthur, Kristján Kristjánsson, Sandra Cooke, Emma Brown, and David Carr, The Good 
Teacher. Understanding Virtues in Practice. Research Report. (The Jubilee Center for Character 
and Virtues, University of Birmingham), accessed on March 1, 2016, http://www.jubileecentre. 
ac.uk/userfiles/jubileecentre/pdf/Research%20Reports/The_Good_Teacher_Understanding_Virt
ues_in_Practice.pdf. 
4 Participants could choose from a list of twenty-four character strengths from the Values in 
Action inventory developed by well-known positive psychologists Peterson and Seligman, see 
Arthur et al. The Good Teacher, 13. Humility is one of the options in this inventory. 
5 It is important to note that the researchers in this study do explicate their own concept of 
teaching as connected to phronesis (see e.g. Arthur et al., The Good Teacher, 8-10 and 26-28) 
and this in many ways aligns with the concept of teaching in the strong sense that I detail in this 
chapter. My concern is that while the researchers agree that conceptions of teaching matter (e.g. 
Arthur et al., The Good Teacher, 26) to the debate on good teaching, the methods they used in 
the study cannot thoroughly tell us whether practitioners interviewed shared the researchers’ 
concept of good teaching. 
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Part 1: Humility and Its Educative Dimension 
In order to get at an understanding of the educative dimension of humility it is 
first necessary to understand the relational aspects of humility, that is, that it 
involves a relation to self and a relation to others. The idea that humility involves 
a self-relation may be seen to be part of the common way we think about 
humility. Humility can ordinarily be understood as involving a relation to the 
status of one’s own knowledge, ability, truth or understanding, and so in this sense 
it involves a relation to self. However, John Dewey’s discussion of humility 
expresses the idea that even in this self-relation there is an implicit relation to 
others: humility is a “feeling of self as related to others.”6 In this section, I first 
turn to contemporary virtue epistemology discourse and then back to Dewey in 
order to further explain how we can understand the relational aspects of humility. 
I will argue that the relation to self and to other implied in humility are educative 
relations that involve seeing oneself as a learner, and seeing others as those from 
whom one can learn. I refer to this educative, relational aspect of humility as its 
educative dimension.  
What is the nature of the self-relation involved in humility? While we 
might agree that humility is not a high estimation of oneself, which could be a 
self-relation more associated with pride, we could take the other extreme and say 
that the self-relation involved in humility is one of having a low estimation of 
oneself, that is, what one knows, understands or can do. Whitcomb, Battaly, Baehr 
and Howard-Snyder7 argue against this more common notion of humility8 in their 
recent discussion of intellectual humility, and in doing so suggest not only a 
different relation to self, but also a particular relation to others, involved in 
humility. Their definition of intellectual humility offers initial insight to what I 
am calling the educative dimension of humility. 
                                                                
6  John Dewey,“Psychology (1887),”in Vol. 2 of The Collected Works of John Dewey. The Early 
Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), 287. The 
question whether humility should be called a feeling or a virtue is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Dewey discusses humility at times as a social or moral feeling and at times, in other ways 
that connect to understanding it as a virtue (as I discuss below). My point in referencing Dewey 
here is to draw out the idea of the self and other relations involved in the concept of and 
expressions of humility. 
7 Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr, and Daniel Howard-Snyder, "Intellectual 
Humility: Owning Our Limitations," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91, 1 (2015), 
accessed July 19, 2016, https://jasonbaehr.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/ih-owning.pdf. 
8 Whitcomb, et al., point out that not only the Oxford dictionary defines humility as “a low 
opinion of oneself,” but that some scholars support such a view as well. See their discussion in 
“Intellectual Humility,” 3-6, and 15. 
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Whitcomb et al. provide a two-part definition of intellectual humility. 
Intellectual humility involves on the one hand a consciousness of one’s 
limitations, that they refer to as (i) “a proper attentiveness to one’s intellectual 
limitations.” But, it also involves what they call (ii) the “owning of one’s 
intellectual limitations.” I will look at each of these aspects in turn and then 
discuss how their definition helps us understand not only the self-relation, but 
also the other-relation that is embedded in the concept of humility.  
For Whitcomb et al. “proper attentiveness” means that a person has the 
disposition to be aware of his or her limitation, given a situation in which this is 
called for.9 They emphasise that this does not mean that one has a constant 
preoccupation with one’s limitations.10 This idea resonates with Richard Paul’s 
definition of intellectual and moral humility, as “having a consciousness of the 
limits of one’s knowledge, including a sensitivity to circumstances in which one’s 
native egocentrism is likely to function self-deceptively; sensitivity to bias, 
prejudice, and limitations of one’s viewpoint.”11 Paul would also appear to be in 
agreement with Whitcomb et. al. that humility does not entail a particularly low 
opinion of oneself, since he states that humility does not imply behaviours of 
“spinelessness or submissiveness” that may be characteristic of such a person with 
low self-regard.12  
However, Whitcomb et al. take their definition of humility a step further 
by adding that proper attentiveness is not enough to qualify as having intellectual 
humility. They state that a person with intellectual humility must also own her 
limitations. Their notion of owning is important to my present discussion because, 
on my view, it points to the ways in which humility includes a particular type of 
orientation towards others as those from whom one can learn, which can help 
identify the educative dimension of humility. 
Although the authors do not speak about learning from others as an explicit 
part of their concept, their differentiations between a person who is just aware of 
her limitations and a person who is both aware of and owns her limitations hinges 
upon the person’s interest in change and improvement of his or her knowledge 
                                                                
9 Whitcomb, et al., “Intellectual Humility,” 7. 
10 Ibid., 17. 
11 Richard Paul, “Chapter 12: Ethics without Indoctrination,” in Critical Thinking: What Every 
Person Needs to Survive in a Rapidly Changing World, ed. A. J. A. Binker (Rohnert Park: 
Center for Critical Thinking and Moral Critique, 1990), 189. 
12 Paul, “Chapter 12,” 189. See also, Richard Paul,  “Chapter 13: Critical Thinking, Moral 
Integrity, and Citizenship: Teaching for Intellectual Virtues,” in Critical Thinking: What Every 
Person Needs to Survive in a Rapidly Changing World, ed. A. J. A. Binker, (Rohnert Park: 
Center for Critical Thinking and Moral Critique, 1990), 195. 
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and understanding, and this gets expressed in behaviours reflecting the view that 
others are those from whom he or she can learn. Let us look at one example they 
provide regarding the behavioural response of someone who “owns” his 
limitations. They explain that given a person who is aware “that his most 
cherished beliefs don’t take into account all the relevant evidence,” there are 
different possible responses that person could have to this awareness.13 A person 
could be aware of the limitation, but not own it, in which case he would “draw 
inferences from those beliefs as if they were knowledge [and] he doesn’t try to 
become more informed, and if he were to meet negative evidence, he would 
dismiss it without a fair hearing.”14 However, a person who was aware and owned 
his limitations, according to Whitcomb et al., would “tend to admit their 
limitations to others, avoid pretence, defer to others, draw inferences more 
hesitantly, seek more information, and consider counter-evidence judiciously.”15  
Similarly, they refer to expected motivational responses of a person who is only 
aware of her limitations without owning them would be that she was “unmoved” 
by the awareness, whereas a person who is aware and owns her limitations could 
be expected to be “motivated to do something about them, cares about them, and 
wants to get rid of them.”16 
Whitcomb et al. acknowledge that their notion of “owning limitations” 
involves a degree of “others focus.”17 This others focus is summarised as the 
increased tendency to “defer to others in situations that call upon one’s 
intellectual limitations; to listen to what others say and consider their ideas, even 
when one disagrees with them; and to seek help from others more generally in 
one’s intellectual endeavours.”18 What they do not explicate—but what I wish to 
highlight—is that this “others focus” is based in a certain relation to the other 
implied in the concept of humility: the other is one from whom I can learn, and 
this means that the other can help me identify my own blind spots, that is, 
wherein my limitations lie, such that I question my previously established beliefs, 
ideas and abilities. In this sense, the other is one who can inspire me to transform 
my understanding of the world and my relation to it. 
Thus far, I have sought to make clear my agreement with Whitcomb et.al.’s 
“limitations owning” view of humility (and with Paul’s), specifically with regard 
                                                                
13 Whitcomb, et al., “Intellectual Humility,” 8. 
14 Ibid., 8. 
15 Ibid., 8. 
16 Ibid., 8. 
17 Ibid., 16-17. 
18 Ibid., 17; see also 12-14. 
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to the relational aspects of humility implied. The self-relation consists in an 
acknowledgement of one’s limitations, and the relation to others is one of seeing 
others as those from whom I can learn. But this still does not go quite far enough 
to capture what I am after in referring to the educative dimension of humility.  
What I seek to make more explicit in considering the educative dimension 
of humility is that the acknowledgement of one’s limitation already involves a 
certain kind of learning process. The moment that one acknowledges that one has 
a limitation, for example, that one does not know how to solve a mathematical 
problem, or does not understand the political message of Virginia Woolf’s “A room 
of one’s own,” or more generally cannot grasp the meaning of any new, unfamiliar 
or different interaction with the world or others, suggests that one has 
encountered a blind spot. When this blind spot is “revealed” through our 
interactions with others—their questions, ideas, perspectives, wishes, writings—
and as a humble person we acknowledge it as a blind spot, the self-relation that 
arises through this moment of acknowledgement is already mediated by our 
interaction with others who are different from ourselves in some way. 
The self-relation implied in humility is always already a relation to others; 
it is a recognition that the other matters, and can affect me; this is precisely what I 
mean when I say the other is recognized as one from whom I can learn. For this 
reason, humility is closely tied to other virtues, such as open-mindedness and 
critical thinking, which presuppose a sense of one’s own fallibility and include an 
openness to alternative viewpoints.19  
Thus, humility, on my account, includes a certain kind of self-relation or 
orientation towards oneself that can be described as seeing oneself as “capable of 
learning” and it implies an orientation towards others as those from whom I can 
learn. This idea of the human being as a learning being is captured in several 
different philosophical traditions using the (roughly equivalent) terms “plasticity,” 
“perfectibilité,” or “Bildsamkeit” [educability].20 The idea of plasticity, as Dewey 
                                                                
19 See Ibid., on the connection to open-mindedness, Paul, “Chapter 13,” 189-199, on the 
interdependence of intellectual humility and other virtues, and also William Hare, What Makes 
a Good Teacher, 2nd ed. (London, Ontario: Althouse Press, 1997), who argues both humility, 
open-mindedness as well as other virtues are necessary virtues of the good teacher. To discuss 
these other virtues in depth is beyond the scope of this paper. 
20 Ideas surrounding human plasticity have a long history in philosophy of education, going back 
e.g. to J.J. Rousseau’s discussion of human perfectiblité. In the German tradition, J. F. Herbart’s 
draws on Rousseau as well as on the German tradition of Bildung and develops the notion of 
Bildsamkeit. Both Rousseau and Herbart connect this idea to the human capacity to make moral 
decisions, and therefore relate human perfectibility to what differentiates human beings from 
other animals. Both thinkers influenced Dewey’s notion of human beings as having plasticity, or 
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terms it, describes the fact that human beings learn from their experiences with 
the world of objects and with other human beings. This capacity to learn is based 
in the fact that, as human beings, we encounter things that are different and new 
in our experience—and in that sense unexpected, e.g. an unexpected idea, object 
or interaction,—and this can lead us into doubt, frustration or confusion, since we 
may not yet fully understand what happened or what went wrong. As human 
beings, we can reflect on this unexpected experience and on that basis make 
decisions to change the way we think or act going forward; such decisions to 
change our ways of thinking and doing have moral meaning in so far as they can 
involve going against self-serving habits or self-interested inclinations.  
Dewey draws out this connection between humility and learning when he 
writes:  
Humility is more demanded at our moments of triumph than at those of failure. 
For humility is not caddish self-depreciation. It is the sense of our slight inability 
even with our best intelligence and effort to command events; a sense of our 
dependence upon forces that go their way without our wish and plan. Its purport 
is not to relax effort but to make us prize every opportunity of present growth.21 
The passage highlights that the person with humility recognises that it is a 
fact of existence that we are subject to circumstances beyond our control and that 
we are fallible even in moments of success. A person with humility does not resign 
the desire to learn and grow when successful, but rather seeks out more 
opportunities for growth. Growth, for Dewey, is made possible by our capacity for 
learning from experience, and our recognition of the interdependence of human 
beings; it is stifled by egotistical or illusory self-reliance.22 Humility gets its 
“purport” as he writes, its thrust or spirit, by seeing one’s opportunities for growth, 
which includes learning from and with others. This again points to the educative 
dimension of humility that I am after, which is necessary for understanding the 
connection between humility and teaching in a strong sense. What might it mean 
for a teacher to have humility, when the “others” involved are those trying to 
learn something from her? Does having humility in teaching imply the teacher 
                                                                                                                                       
the capacity to learn in all areas of life. I have discussed this in detail in Andrea R. English, 
Discontinuity in Learning: Dewey, Herbart, and Education as Transformation (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
21 John Dewey, “Human Nature and Conduct (1922),” in Vol. 14 of The Collected Works of John 
Dewey. The Middle Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 2008), 200. 
22 John Dewey, “Democracy and Education (1916)”, in Vol. 9 of The Collected Works of John 
Dewey. The Middle Works, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 2008), 47-50. 
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can learn from her students? If so, what might that learning look like? These 
questions are about the nature of teaching, which I address next.  
Part 2: Teaching in the Strong Sense and Its Connection to Humility 
There are ways that one could define teaching that would not imply humility. I 
will address how teaching has been viewed as “knowledge transmission,” and 
indicate why on that notion, teaching would not imply humility. Then, I will turn 
to defining teaching in a strong sense, as a notion of teaching that does imply that 
humility is a necessary virtue of the teacher.   
Teaching is sometimes referred to as knowledge transmission. This model of 
teaching—also known as an input-output model, wherein the “teacher-as-
transmitter” puts in the information and “learner-as-recipient” recites it back with 
accuracy—is part of a deeply ingrained common sense understanding of what 
teaching is. This notion of teaching has been criticised widely by philosophers of 
education from different traditions,23 including Rousseau, Herbart, Dewey, Freire 
and Peters. Teaching, if understood as a process of the direct transmission of pre-
packaged knowledge to the next generation, does not imply the “humility” of the 
teacher. Rather, since the teacher knows, and the student does not know, then 
there is no need for the teacher to be aware of the limits of her knowledge, or 
allow for the possibility of self-deception. On this model, the nature of the 
teacher-learner interaction also does not provide circumstances in which the 
teacher would come to know these limitations. On this paradigm of teaching and 
learning, the teacher’s knowledge is not to be questioned by students. The teacher 
is the authority in control of knowledge being passed on within the teacher-
student relationship and so humility is not necessary. This paradigm relies on 
particular notions of knowledge as immutable morsels, or as Dewey calls it, 
“ready-made” knowledge, to be passed on from one person, the teacher, to 
another, the learner, a passive recipient. Dewey criticises such ideas of the learner 
(and in turn, the models of teaching they recommend), contending that they rest 
upon a false idea of the mind as purely receptive, and separated from the activities 
of the body.24  
But the notion of knowledge and the mind embedded in this idea of 
“teaching” are not the only problems with it; rather there is also a problematic 
concept of learning it relies on. Learning is viewed as the linear step-by-step 
                                                                
23 And this, even as they disagree on a positive conception of teaching. 
24 Dewey’s criticism of this mind and body dualism is part of his criticism of dualisms in the 
long-standing tradition of western philosophy, which he discusses e.g. in the first several 
chapters of Democracy and Education. 
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acquisition of pre-packaged knowledge, which in practice means the 
memorisation and regurgitation of finished ideas and facts. Such a notion of 
learning, as I have discussed in depth elsewhere, fails to include the discontinuities 
that are part of all human learning processes.25 Without a connection to this 
significant aspect of human learning, it does not provide an adequate foundation 
for a concept of teaching. Thus, I contend that “teaching as transmission,” even 
though we nominally refer to it as teaching, does not meet the criteria for even 
the “weak sense” of teaching (discussed below); rather it is not teaching at all. 
Before I provide my positive account of teaching in the strong sense, I will 
briefly point out a few significant aspects of the concept of learning it is grounded 
in, especially those that connect to the experience of limitation. On the view I 
have put forward elsewhere, educative, transformative processes of learning are 
connected to processes of human experience.26 To learn involves an encounter 
with something new, and in that sense, different, strange or unfamiliar, otherwise 
it would not be learning, it would only be reiteration of what one already knows. 
This encounter can be characterised as an experience of limitation, because it 
points us to what we do not know, do not understand, or are not yet able to do. 
There are certain ways of describing our experience of limitation that span at least 
to the time of Socrates, continuing through classical philosophers of education, 
e.g. Herbart and Dewey, and further through to contemporary philosophers of 
education talking about doubt, disillusionment, puzzlement, or even fear as part of 
learning processes.27 Though these notions refer to different phenomena, they 
                                                                
25 See, English, Discontinuity in Learning, and Andrea R. English, “John Dewey and the Role of 
the Teacher in a Globalized World: Imagination, Empathy, and ‘Third Voice,’” Educational 
Philosophy and Theory 48, 10 (2016): 1046–1064. Accessed September 15, 2016. 
doi:10.1080/00131857.2016.1202806. 
26 English, Discontinuity in Learning. 
27 See Ibid.; see also e.g  John Passmore, “On Teaching to be Critical,” in The Concept of 
Education, ed. Richard S. Peters (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1967); Fritz Oser, 
“Negatives Wissen und Moral,” Zeitschrift für Pädagogik 49 (2005): 171-181; Nicholas C. 
Burbules, “Aporias, Webs, and Passages: Doubt as an Opportunity to Learn,” Curriculum 
Inquiry, 30, 2 (2000): 171-187; Dietrich Benner, “Kritik und Negativität. Ein Versuch zur 
Pluralisierung von Kritik in Erziehung, Pädagogik und Erziehungswissenschaft,” Zeitschrift für 
Pädagogik 46 (2003): 96-110; Käte Meyer-Drawe, “Lernen als Umlernen – Zur Negativität des 
Lernprozesses,” in Lernen und seine Horizonte. Phänomenologische Konzeptionen 
Menschlichen Lernens – Didaktische Konsequenzen, eds. Käte Meyer-Drawe and Winfried 
Lippitz (Frankfurt: Scriptor, 1984); Deborah Kerdeman, “Pulled Up Short: Challenging Self-
Understanding as a Focus for Teaching and Learning,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 
(2003): 293-308; Andrea English and Barbara Stengel, “Exploring Fear: Rousseau, Dewey and 
Freire on Fear and Learning,” Educational Theory 60, 5 (2010): 521-542. 
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each point to the fact that our experience of the world includes what I call 
discontinuities—breaks in our experience, expressed in moments of doubt or 
frustration. Discontinuity in experience arises due to the fact that the world of 
objects or others have in some way defied one’s expectations, pointing to a blind 
spot or limitation.  
Discontinuity as the experience of limitation is indispensable to learning. If 
we take for example, Plato’s Cave, we can illustrate the productive meaning of 
discontinuity. The prisoner experiences limitation as moments of alienation, 
disillusionment and fear as he exists the cave and finds himself confronting new 
objects and ideas. Viewed in terms of learning, these moments are indispensable in 
the prisoner’s process of coming to understand the new objects and ideas he is 
encountering.28 These encounters with limitation involve a break with oneself as a 
moment of interruption, in which we may fall into doubt because the old is no 
longer sufficient, but the new way of understanding the world has not yet been 
found.29 But this experience alone is not what we would call learning as a 
“reflective experience,” to use Dewey’s term. In reflective learning experiences, 
the moment of discontinuity sparks thinking and inquiry; our thinking is aimed at 
seeking to understand the nature of the discontinuity in our experience, such that 
we seek to understand why we are in doubt, and in what ways what we thought 
to be true and valid now need to be reconsidered, modified or thrown out. In 
these moments, one may ask oneself, what is it that I thought before that now 
does not seem to fit? What ideas were guiding me that now seem in need of 
modification? Do my ideas, or does something in the world, or do both, need to 
change? 
Learning processes that involve the kinds of critical questioning and inquiry 
described have what I call two beginnings, each of which are significant for how I 
                                                                
28 For a more detailed analysis of this example see English, Discontinuity in Learning, chapter 6. 
29 Certainly, colloquially speaking we often use the term learning to refer to experiences that do 
not seem to be transformative in this way, for example, we may hear the newscaster say “it is 
raining today,” and so we may say that we “learned” it was raining. But what is important here 
in the way I am talking about learning is its connection to education; learning on this view is 
not just a one-way street of acquiring knowledge. For Günther Buck, John Dewey and others 
genuine learning is connected to our experience of the world and this experience involves a 
back and forth interaction between self and other that is not smooth and continuous rather 
involves, gaps, interruptions, “bumps in the road” as we try to navigate the world and 
understand it. This is the kind of learning I see as important when we are talking of learning as 
an educational process. Mathematics education has developed the term “deep learning” to get at 
this educative sense of learning. 
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define teaching.30 The first is a pre-reflective beginning to learning. It occurs 
when we encounter something unexpected, a new object or idea, and 
characteristically comes forth in our becoming perplexed or confused. The second 
beginning to learning is one that we consciously choose. It occurs when we start 
to transform the pre-reflective interruption in our experience into a question or 
problem into which we can inquire. On my notion of learning as a transformative 
process, both of these beginnings are indispensable to the process of coming to 
understand something new.  
This concept of learning takes account of the human experience of 
limitation as essential to what it means to learn. The experience of limitation has 
the potential to lead us to call into question the knowledge and beliefs that we 
previously took for granted as true. Our struggle to understand this experience of 
limitation can only be considered productive, as opposed to destructive, if it leads 
to self-reflection and self-questioning of the taken-for-granted. Such acts of self-
reflection, that is, of reflection on what we know and do not know and on our 
relation to the world, are acknowledgements that the other matters in our 
experience, that the recognition of the connection between self and other is part 
of what it means to be human. 
So what is teaching in a strong sense? As I have sought to show above, 
humility is generally characterised as having to do with the attention to or 
recognition of one’s limitations, be that in reference to knowledge, truth and 
understanding, or in reference to moral knowledge and moral decision-making 
ability. I also argued that learning involves the experience of limitation (a 
discontinuity in experience) and the reflective engagement with one’s experience 
of limitation. I will now focus on how teaching in a strong sense connects to the 
learners’ experiences of limitation, how this implies the teacher’s humility, and 
finally what makes this idea of teaching “teaching in a strong sense.” 
When we grasp learning as entailing discontinuity, that is, as involving the 
learner’s encounter with his own blind spots, as well as a reflective inquiry into 
what that “blind spot” or limitations may consist in, then teaching as a task that 
connects to learning31 can be best conceived of as initiating and engaging 
                                                                
30 English, Discontinuity in Learning, chapter 4. 
31 Peters discusses the important issue around how the concept of teaching is connected to 
student learning. He notes that teaching can be a task term pointing to a particular activity of 
teaching, but also an achievement term pointing to the result the teacher is trying to achieve. 
For Peters, both are connected to the concept of teaching, but the success of teaching is 
determined by its result in the learner learning something, Richard S. Peters, “What is an 
Educational Process?,” in The Concept of Education, ed. Richard S. Peters (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1967). See my discussion of this in Andrea R. English, “Transformation and 
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discontinuities in learners’ experiences.32 The teacher’s task is to make the world 
educative for learners, and this involves helping them take it apart and explore 
realms that otherwise may be arbitrarily ignored or intentionally avoided out of 
fear or lack of interest. To do this, teachers have to learn to cultivate uncertainty 
and other forms of discontinuities in experience, in productive ways, so that 
learners begin to question their knowledge and beliefs, and those of others.33 
When construed in this way, teaching is inherently a moral practice in the sense 
that it aims to teacher learners to think and choose to learn from others. Through 
the teacher’s questions and challenges, learners begin to question their own 
beliefs, think critically and begin to search for new knowledge.  
The task of teaching as being one involving helping learners’ identify what 
they do not know and cannot yet do, means helping them identify limitations. 
But, this notion of teaching implies that the teacher is willing to run up against 
her own limitations and engaging in self-critical reflection upon such limitations.34 
In order to help others find their own blind spots, the teacher has to challenge 
them, but she cannot entirely foresee how learners will respond and whether she 
is presenting them with the right kind of challenge, or whether she is over- or 
under-challenging them. So the very nature of the task of teaching has a certain 
level of risk and requires improvisation. When the teacher encounters a limitation 
in the context of the teacher-learner relation and becomes uncertain, the teacher’s 
uncertainty with reference to how to teach is mediated by the problems and 
uncertainties the learner or learners have with how to learn. This “twofold 
discontinuity,” that is the discontinuities (as doubt, frustration, uncertainty) in the 
teacher’s experience that are mediated by the discontinuities in learners’ 
                                                                                                                                       
Education: The Voice of the Learner in Peters' Concept of Teaching. Journal of Philosophy of 
Education 43, 1 (2009). I will not go further into these details here, rather my focus is to 
underscore that teaching in a strong sense conceives of the experience of teaching as linking to 
the learner’s experience of learning in certain ways. 
32 English, Discontinuity in Learning, 80-86. 
33 This task of the teacher relates to what Pritchard calls “epistemically unfriendly 
environments,” which he views as necessary for strong-cognitive achievement associated with 
gaining understanding, in Duncan Pritchard, “Epistemic Virtue and the Epistemology of 
Education,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 47, 2 (2013): 236-247. In my previous work, I 
examine more closely the types of environments that are essential for challenging learners’ in 
productive ways that involve initiating discontinuities in their experiences in a way that would 
align with what Pritchard has in mind with his concept, see English Discontinuity in Learning, 
87-96. 
34 Andrea R. English, “Dialogic Teaching and Moral Learning: Self-Critique, Narrativity, 
Community and ‘Blind Spots,’” Journal of Philosophy of Education 50, 2 (2016): 160-176. 
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experience, are an indispensable part of teaching.35 For this reason, teaching, as I 
define it, is a reflective practice—it requires teachers to become interrupted and 
think reflectively about the nature of that interruption for the sake of continuing 
to help others learn. Thus, as a reflective practice, teaching requires what Herbart 
calls pedagogical tact, a form of phronesis as it applies to decisions made in the 
moment about what to teach and how to teach it to particular learners.36  
Given this understanding of teaching, teaching implies humility. It involves 
being aware of one’s limitations, aiming to address them and, in doing so, 
recognising one’s relation to others as those one can learn from, and to oneself as 
one who can learn. For the teacher, this means seeing students as those from 
whom she can learn. Specifically, she can and must learn of her own limitations in 
order to know to what extent she is able to teach particular students a particular 
subject matter at a particular time. In this sense, she also must see herself as a 
learner, and this is connected to the fact that humility in teaching must mean 
owning one’s limitations. That is to say, that humility in teaching necessarily 
involves carefully attending to the limitations one has found in the realm of 
teaching, and trying to overcome them. For example, when a teacher has become 
very good at teaching English literature, but then has new students in a class that 
do not have English as a first language, she may recognise her limitation in 
teaching these students. The limitation of the students—their difficulty in 
learning English literature—initiates the teacher’s recognition of her limitation—
her inability to be able to teach these students in this topic. 
But mere recognition of her limitation would not be enough to say she has 
humility. According to the notions of humility I brought together above, to have 
humility as a teacher would also mean that the teacher owns the limitation, and 
thus seeks to address it and grow. The teacher could express that she owned the 
limitation by talking to the students about their specific difficulties and by 
changing assessment tasks so that they have other kinds of opportunities to show 
their knowledge and abilities. To have humility involves, as I have said above, the 
teacher seeing seeing herself as a learner, and seeing the students as others she can 
learn from. The interactions with the students help her to experience her 
limitation and initiate thinking around those limitations and, in taking these 
                                                                
35 See English, Discontinuity in Learning; 83 and 140; and, Benner, “Kritik und Negativität.” 
36 See Johann F. Herbart, “The Science of Education (1806),” in The Science of Education, its 
General Principles Deduced from its Aim, and The Aesthetic Revelation of the World, trans. 
Henry M. Felkin and Emmie Felkin (Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1902); Max van Manen, The 
Tact of Teaching. The Meaning of Pedagogical Thoughtfulness (London: Althouse Press, 1991); 
English, Discontinuity in Learning; and, Arthur et al. The Good Teacher. 
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limitations seriously and owning them, she sees herself as a learner who can learn 
how to overcome these limitations.  
Teaching, in the sense described here, is a unique reflective practice and 
this uniqueness as a reflective practice is what helps clarify why we can call it a 
strong sense of teaching. Even if pure “transmission” is not teaching at all, there is 
still the possibility for a weak sense of teaching. Whether the notion of teaching 
has a weak or strong sense is determined by the role played by the teacher’s 
critical reflection on her own limitations arising from the students’ embodied 
experiences of limitation. A weak sense of teaching, which associates teaching 
with a narrow focus on students’ cognitive development (to the exclusion of other 
aspects of the students’ experiences), may include the view that teachers reflect on 
their limitations arising from students’ cognitive limitations—which come forth as 
mistakes or misconceptions—in order to find ways to get students to successfully 
arrive at the defined goal. But in this weak sense case, the teacher’s self reflection 
would be superficial in that it is focused on how to get the student who erred back 
on the right path (with the path defined by what the teacher had preplanned for 
the lesson), whether or not the student is gaining understanding. Such weak sense 
teaching in practice is characterised by closed questions, minimal challenge, and 
social encounters of students relegated to a secondary role of aiding students’ 
cognitive gains.37  
The strong sense of teaching views the teacher’s critical reflection on her 
limitations that arise from the teacher-learner relation (the twofold discontinuities 
in her experiences) as central. This means in practice that the teacher will initiate 
students’ experiences of limitation, engage those that arise, and create situations in 
which students’ initiate and engage limitation together. This is the same as saying 
that the strong sense notion recognises teaching as a unique reflective practice, in 
which the students’ experiences of limitations can spark the teacher’s experience 
of limitation (as described in the example of the literature teacher, where the 
students’ difficulty in how to learn initiated a difficulty for the teacher in how to 
teach). The space of critical, reflective thinking of the teacher in this sense is 
always aimed at increasing the learner’s space of reflective thinking.38 In 
                                                                
37 This view of teaching relates to the idea of teaching being questioned in current research in 
education, which notes the failure of teachers to view moral and social education as part of their 
task, and the failure of teacher education programmes to teach pre-service teachers about the 
broader dimensions of their task (see e.g. Arthur et.al. The Good Teacher, 8-9; and Peterson 
et.al., Schools with Soul.) 
38 I refer to this as an in-between realm of learning, or what Dewey calls “the twilight zone of 
inquiry,” that is found when our thinking resides between right and wrong, knowing and not 
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expressions of humility, teachers open up spaces for their own reflective thinking, 
which is intimately tied to their ability to open up spaces for students’ reflective 
thinking.  
Part 3: Humility in Teaching, Especially Its Educative Dimension, Is Learned by 
Listening to Students  
Paulo Freire refers to humility as an “indispensable quality” of the teacher, but 
also as a quality “acquired gradually through the practice” of teaching.39  The idea 
is at first puzzling, for if humility is an indispensable quality of teachers, then from 
the start one must have humility in order to be able to teach. However, if humility 
is acquired gradually through teaching practice, then this must mean that one has 
to be a teacher first and humility would then be acquired in the process of 
practising as a teacher. With the concept of teaching detailed in part two, I sought 
to show that humility is indispensable to being a teacher, because humility is 
implied in the concept of teaching (which is to say that to accept the task of 
teaching, one would have be aware of one’s limitations, accept new limitations 
when they present themselves, allow oneself to be corrected by others, locate and 
acknowledge bias, etc.). Therefore from my foregoing discussion, we can see the 
validity of Freire’s idea that humility is indispensable to teaching. 
In this section, I argue that it is not a contradiction to also agree with the 
second part of Freire's statement, namely, that humility is acquired gradually in 
the practice of teaching. On my reading, what Freire means is that one should 
have humility to become a teacher, but gradually, through the practice of teaching 
one will begin to understand humility in its particular relation to being a teacher. 
Specifically, I argue that what is learned gradually through the practice of 
teaching is the understanding and ability to express the educative dimension of 
humility. In this section, I will examine how humility is learned within the 
teacher-learner relationship, wherein teachers are receptive to students through 
listening. I close the section with a discussion of how such teacher-learner 
interaction connects to cultivating humility in students. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
knowing. For an extended discussion of the “in-between realm of learning” see English, 
Discontinuity in Learning, chapter 4. 
39 Paulo Freire, Teachers as Cultural Workers. Letters to Those Who Dare Teach (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 2005), 71. 
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Listening and Teaching 
Teaching in the strong sense, in practice, involves what I have elsewhere 
described as critical-educative listening.40 Before discussing this concept as it 
relates to humility in teaching, it is helpful to first look at uneducative listening. A 
teacher who is trying to transmit pre-packaged knowledge to students can be 
considered to listen in uneducative ways. Their listening is evaluative, focused on 
mechanically filtering right and wrong answers, a mode of listening associated 
with what Dewey calls a traditional model of instruction, where the teacher 
provides the subject matter and “listens for the accuracy with which it is 
produced.”41 For example, the teacher may didactically present the “fives” of the 
multiplication tables on the board and then ask the class “What is five times five?” 
If a student’s answer is “ten,” it is deemed wrong and the teacher may listen on, 
but only to wait for a student to arrive at the right answer. This framework for a 
teacher’s questions is reserved for confirming the acquisition of specific 
knowledge, so that interruptions, such as differences of opinion or unexpected 
responses in the classroom, are classified as a lack of understanding, as nothing 
more than “wrong answers.”42 
                                                                
40 See English, Discontinuity in Learning, 134-142. Research on listening in education has 
grown over the past several years, with philosophers of education developing various concepts 
of listening. In my current Spencer Foundation funded research with colleagues Drs Allison 
Hintz and Kersti Tyson we are developing a broad framework of listening in teaching that 
incorporates many recent concept of listening, including critical-educative listening. In this 
paper, my focus is on critical-educative listening due to its connection to the teacher’s learning 
around limitations. For some of the recent discourse on listening, see edited volumes, Sophie 
Haroutunian-Gordon and Megan Laverty, eds., Listening: An Exploration of Philosophical 
Traditions. Special Issue. Educational Theory 61, 2 (2011); and, Leonard J. Waks, ed., Listening 
to Teach: Beyond Didactic Pedagogy (New York: SUNY, 2015). 
41 Dewey, Democracy and Education, 167. 
42 Some may call into question whether teaching really still happens in this narrow way 
anymore and even whether we need to think about the types of practices that may follow from 
a notion of teaching. But empirical studies show that teachers in schools still often follow this 
model of what Oser and Spychiger call “A Didactic of Error Avoidance,” wherein the teacher 
asks a question and goes from student to student until she gets the right answer and then moves 
on. In such a classroom structure, no one actually learns, the student who answered correctly 
already knew, and the students who did not, are still left with a lack of understanding at how to 
get to the right answer, Fritz Oser and Maria Spychiger, Lernen ist Schmerzhaft: Zur Theorie 
des negativen Wissens und zur Praxis der Fehlerkultur (Weinheim: Beltz, 2005), 163; see also 
Robin J. Alexander, Towards Dialogic Teaching: Rethinking Classroom Talk. (Cambridge: 
Dialogos, 2006). 
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Understanding the role of critical-educative listening in teaching helps to 
illuminate how teachers gain humility through the practice of teaching. Through 
listening, teachers can become open to difference and otherness that arises in the 
teacher–learner relation. When listening to the learner is aimed at initiating and 
engaging productive discontinuities in the learner’s experience, it becomes 
educative. This listening may in fact aide in helping learners understand 
misconceptions—for example, if the teacher find that her students do not 
understand how to find one-half of a whole number, she may formulate new 
questions or tasks for the students to address this lack of understanding—but the 
aim of critical-educative listening is different than evaluative listening. The 
teacher’s listening is critical and educative when the teacher is engaged in 
listening for signs that a productive struggle is taking place in the learners’ 
experiences, and simultaneously, listening for ways to support learners’ to think 
about the discontinuity and struggle they now find themselves in and inquire into 
it, so that they move towards a reflective learning process. On this account, when 
teachers are engaged in critical-educative listening, they are particularly attuned 
to interruptions in their own experience, that is, to discontinuities which point 
them to the fact that they may have arrived at the limit of knowledge or ability, 
either with respect to how to teach a particular learner or with respect to how to 
teach more generally. These interruptions in the teacher’s experience can indicate 
interruptions in the learner’s experiences, identifying to the teacher that the 
learner has in some way become lost or confused and may not know how to move 
on. When these interruptions are mediated by what the teacher hears, they can 
come forth as any unexpected response from a student (such as a difficult question, 
a challenging viewpoint, or a confusing reply) to the tasks presented in a learning 
situation.  
The educative dimension of humility, as I have been emphasising, refers to 
the relation to self and other it implies, namely, it implies that the humble person 
recognises others as those from whom one can learn of one’s own limitations, and 
it implies that the humble person sees herself as a learner who can productively 
address the limitations. One fairly straightforward way to imagine that teachers 
can learn of their own limitations is with respect to the subject matter being 
taught. This could occur if for example a student offered a different, but equally 
valid perspective on a topic, or demonstrated stronger reasons for believing 
something other than what the teacher stated, such that the teacher could show 
humility by allowing herself to be corrected. This is what Leonard Waks calls 
“self-critical humility” in teaching, which is mediated by listening to students and 
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involves allowing students to correct one’s views.43 Similarly, William Hare 
discusses humility in teaching as involving the teacher recognising “the possibility 
of improving his or her present knowledge and understanding.”44 But as I will seek 
to show teachers can also learn from their students with respect to how to teach. 
This involves being attuned to students’ thinking and learning within their 
embodied experiences, including both the cognitive realm of learning particular 
subject matter, and the social and moral realm of learning interactions that respect 
and recognise others. What it means to learn from students with respect to their 
social and moral learning processes is less straightforward, but can be illustrated 
with an example.  
I provide here an example which highlights how the educative dimension 
of humility is acquired through practice of teaching, specifically by listening to 
students’ discontinuities in social and moral learning processes. The example is 
from a segment of the documentary of a fifth grade classroom, August to June: 
Bringing Life to Schools. It is important to note that the film was chosen because 
the teacher in this film, who not only shows the audience inside her classroom for 
a year, but also discusses her views on teaching, appears to me to have views 
which align with teaching in a strong sense as I have defined it here. In the film, 
we see two students who were placed together to work on a science assignment 
involving building a Lego-like model of a pulley. The two students become 
frustrated and the camera shows the teacher has sat down to listen to their 
problem:  
                                                                
43 Leonard J. Waks, “Humility in Teaching.” Accessed April 5, 2016. http://www.academia.edu/ 
11700171/Humility_in_Teaching. Waks also discusses what he calls trans-critical humility, in 
which the teacher offers herself as a resource to others without trying to teach something 
specific, and without a strict sense of thinking aimed at self-critique. My colleague Dr Waks and 
I work together on listening as part of the international research network ‘Listening Study 
Group’, and recently discovered that we were both working on the topic of humility and its 
connection to listening and teaching. I am grateful for our recent conversations on this topic. 
44 Hare, What Makes a Good Teacher, 39. Paul provides an example of a teacher coming to 
improve his knowledge and understanding of physics and in that sense demonstrating 
intellectual humility. Paul cites a letter from a physics teacher with 20 years of experience, who 
came to the realisation that he had memorised canned “textbook answers” to students’ 
questions, and that these were insufficient for addressing the students’ questions. The students 
made the teacher start to rethink these answers, and he acknowledged that in his own schooling 
he had “memorise[d] the thoughts of others” and had “never learned or been encouraged to 
learn to think for [him]self,” see Paul, “Chapter 13,” 195. Paul’s reading of the example 
emphasises that the connection to intellectual humility is found in the fact that the teacher 
began to think about the nature of knowledge, since the answers the teacher was giving to 
students lacked justification in his own thinking. 
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Student A: Yeah, but she wasn’t trying to understand it, she kept on trying 
to do it her way. 
Student B: I was trying to understand it, it’s just you weren’t explaining 
right. 
The teacher replies: [To Student B] Right now, I need you and Alani to find 
a way to cooperate to get this done and you need to, that’s your job, that is the job 
that you have right now, to prove to each other that you can pass the test of 
working together, a much more important test to me than whether you do the star 
test right, I want to see how you learn to cooperate with each other, that is one of 
the big parts of this job. 
The two girls are then shown to be fully cooperating together, sharing 
ideas, physically coordinating movements to hold up the pulley, and singing 
through the task until its completion.45  
With reference to this case, I will discuss three ways that we can 
understand what it means for a teacher to learn to understand and express the 
educative dimension of humility by listening to students. First, the example 
illustrates that through listening teachers learn of the particular discontinuities in 
students’ learning processes (which, in this case, was related to them each running 
up against a social difficulty in working together). The teacher in the example 
listens in a way that appears to take seriously the discontinuities in the two 
students’ learning processes. In doing so, the teacher gains an understanding of the 
students’ needs with respect to their social and moral blind spots. Her decision to 
modify the task to become a task around working together and collaborating, 
rather than primarily a task to learn a scientific concept, reveals her ability to shift 
her practice to address an oversight in her original design of the task, and 
transform it to fit the needs of these particular learners at this particular time. In 
this self-critical shift, which reflects the teacher’s pedagogical tact or phronesis, 
the teacher shows an ability to help the learners’ where they were stuck, and 
transform what could have been a “destructive” discontinuity in their experience 
(which, in this case, can be characterised as a form of frustration that could have 
not only made them stop learning the science task, but also stop any desire to 
learn with and from each other) to a “productive,” and reflective learning process. 
Learning humility through teaching then means that teachers learn through the 
engagement with particular learners; they learn what the limits of their 
knowledge and ability are in relation to those particular learners. To understand 
how this works it is helpful to take recourse to Nel Noddings’ distinction between 
                                                                
45 August to June: Bringing Life to Schools. DVD, directed by Tom Valens (Tamalpais 
Productions, 2013). 1:13-1:15. 
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assumed needs and expressed needs.46 Before a specific encounter with learners, 
the teacher can and must reflectively try to speculate about particular learners’ 
needs and assume certain needs based on the assumed level of knowledge and 
ability of the students. But their actual needs are expressed within the interaction; 
they emerge through the interaction. The teacher who is teaching in a strong 
sense takes this difference between assumed and expressed needs seriously and 
recognises the need to seek appropriate ways to shift practice in the moment.  
Secondly, the example illustrates more indirectly how teachers learn of the 
possible discontinuities in learning—difficulties, doubts, fears, frustrations—that 
students’ can have more generally, either with reference to a particular subject 
matter or with reference to the social and moral demands of learning. This may 
look differently depending on the age group of the students, but even in higher 
education, as groups of students’ come together of different gender, race or 
cultural backgrounds, questions of how to help students learn together and 
overcome potential bias can become an explicit part of the teacher’s task in 
reaching specific intellectual goals relating to the subject matter. Through the 
interactions with students, teachers gain a greater sense of how learning tasks can 
break down when students try to work together. Over time teachers acquire 
humility by continuing to encounter certain types of limitations, and expanding 
their understanding of what limitations are possible as they gain an increased 
understanding of students’ needs.    
Finally, there is a third way that we can understand how the educative 
dimension of humility is gained in teaching practice. Through the practice of 
teaching that is connected to the concept of strong sense teaching, teachers learn 
to have the disposition of pedagogical tact or phronesis in teaching. This involves 
recognising the inherent and necessary limitation that is part of what it means to 
be a teacher. This inherent limitation is found in the fact that one’s own 
determination of whether an act of teaching is productive and educative must 
always be tempered by the fact that the learner co-creates the educational 
situation. What counts as an educational experience has to be negotiated with 
particular learners. As the particularities of this negotiation become more apparent 
within the practice of teaching, teachers learn how to better plan for learning 
situations, and better respond to the unexpected situations that arise in the 
moment. In considering this, we can understand why Freire states (somewhat 
cryptically) that humility is expressed as an “uncertain certainty” or an “insecure 
                                                                
46 Nel Noddings, “Identifying and Responding to Needs in Education,” Cambridge Journal of 
Education 35, 2 (2005): 147-159. Accessed June 1, 2016. doi:10.1080/03057640500146757. 
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security.”47 Reflective, “strong sense” teaching, in practice means learning, over 
time, how to plan for situations that are educational. In this sense, teachers can 
gain confidence in their plans. However, at the same time, since educational 
situations always involve the learners’ contributions, teachers can never foresee 
entirely what the situations of learning will demand. Taken together, the 
confidence that builds up through understanding the relation of theory to 
practice, and the uncertainty that necessarily accompanies it, is part of what 
makes humility a virtue that is gained gradually through the practice of teaching.  
Teaching in the strong sense implies seeing teaching as a task that involves 
being attuned to the learner as a person, and this means understanding students’ 
embodied experiences, including both cognitive and social-moral needs of 
students. To say that teachers gain humility over time through a reflective strong 
sense of teaching means that through their continual engagement with learners, 
they begin to gain a sense of students’ needs generally. When this understanding 
of students takes hold, this can lead to profound expressions of humility, like that 
expressed recently by Steven Strogatz, Professor of Applied Mathematics at 
Cornell, who confessed in his blog that his lectures were not getting students to 
engage deeply with the material, and how this led him to completely redesigned 
his approach to teaching.48 The truly reflective teacher also is always aware that 
she can never be freed from the fact that new, unexpected needs can arise in the 
moment with new learners. Whether a teacher genuinely addresses the needs of 
learners, whether her teaching is educative (in that it takes account of those needs 
and helps learners reflectively address their own limitations), is always negotiated 
in the act of teaching itself. This act therefore must involve reflective engagement 
and dialogue with students.   
A Note on Cultivating Virtues in Students: The case of Humility 
In 1909, Dewey makes an important connection between teaching and its relation 
to students’ virtues or vices, which is still relevant today. He makes the point that 
forms of transmission teaching actually contribute to students’ development of 
egoism. He writes, if teaching is construed as mere handing off of pre-packaged 
facts, which involves treating human beings as if they are passive recipients of 
knowledge, that is, as isolated individuals, who learn by way of absorption, and 
recitation, and also involves the judgement of such learners solely on the basis of 
                                                                
47 Freire, Teachers as cultural workers, 72. 
48 See the two full blog posts at https://www.artofmathematics.org/blogs/cvonrenesse/steven-
strogatz-reflection-part-1 and https://www.artofmathematics.org/blogs/cvonrenesse/steven-stro 
gatz-reflection-part-2. 
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their individual output, then their capacity for participation and cooperation is 
hindered. Such modes of interaction that we call teaching, he contends, actually 
have the potential to detrimentally change what he calls the “social spirit” of 
human beings into an individualist way of thinking and behaviour.49  
This sentiment relates to a more recent point by Paul, who notes the 
connection between passive learning and the development of students’ intellectual 
arrogance, that is, that they come to believe “they know a lot about each subject, 
whether or not they understand it.”50 He argues that schools and teachers do not 
promote intellectual and moral virtues when they focus on ‘speed learning’ and 
students gaining superficial chunks of compartmentalised knowledge. Like Dewey, 
he underscores that in fact, such ways of structuring learning processes lead to 
“intellectual arrogance” because they discourage “intellectual perseverance and 
confidence in reason,” “provide no foundation for intellectual empathy,” and 
instead promote students’ “taking in and giving back masses of detail.”51 
These statements are still relevant today as educational policies around the 
world are pushing teachers and schools to quickly get students towards 
predetermined outcomes measurable on standardised tests. Even if teachers 
themselves have different theoretical understandings of what teaching is, in 
practice, such policies force teachers to comply with mechanical, unreflective 
modes of ‘teaching,’ which at its most extreme, as I have argued above, results in 
activities that would not deserve to be called teaching at all.  
With Dewey and others helping us to understand how teaching as a 
mechanical, transmissive task can cultivate students’ vices—such as arrogance— 
can we conclude that reflective, dialogic forms of teaching described above, which 
in theory and in practice strongly oppose mechanical transmissive teaching, 
contribute to cultivating students’ virtues, such as humility?  
Answering this question has not been the focus of this paper, however, 
there are certain conclusions relating to this question implied by my above 
discussion above. First, it would be wrong to conclude that because a teacher has 
humility, her students’ can gain humility by simple imitation. In a strong sense of 
teaching, teaching virtues is always indirect; virtues cannot be directly taught, nor 
cultivated through the disciplined imitation of certain behaviours. Imitation of 
behaviours associated with humility does not imply understanding, and being 
                                                                
49 John Dewey, “Moral Principles in Education (1909),” in The Collected Works of John Dewey. 
The Middle Works, edited by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
2008), 275-279; see also, Dewey, Democracy and Education, 44. 
50 Paul, “Chapter 13,” 192. 
51 Ibid., 192; see also 191-193. 
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virtuous, as I view it, requires certain understandings of self and other.52 I have 
sought to show that part of the teacher’s task is to help the learner identify his or 
her own limitations, and not to see these as end points to the learning process or as 
signs of not learning, but rather as part of the learning process itself. In that 
process, the learner learns of herself as a learning being, which means that she 
learns that she can move past unexpected obstacles. She learns that even though 
she cannot overcome the fact that she is subject to circumstances beyond her 
control, she can create aims reflectively in order to thoughtfully and critically 
engage with the world and others. In doing so, the learner also learns to see others 
as those she can learn from, and gains a sense of her own fallibility. When learners 
learn to grasp the equality between human beings as beings that can and must 
learn from each other, they begin to understand the type of respect that, as Freire 
says, is part of humility.53 
When teaching aims to support learners in identifying and engaging 
discontinuities in personal and social experience, and also create opportunities for 
them to productively do so, then learners learn humility not only as an awareness 
of limitation, and not only as involving  motivation and action to inquire into that 
limitation, but they also learn humility in its educative dimension; they learn that 
others are those from whom they can learn. In this sense, we can say that a strong 
sense of teaching contributes, rather than hinders, the growth of the social spirit 
in human beings—the spirit of interconnectedness, and interdependence upon 
others as inherent to what it means to be human.  
Conclusion: The Hard Problem of Teacher Evaluation  
It would be hard to argue against the fact that not only in primary and secondary 
education, but also in higher education, there needs to be systems in place for the 
evaluation of teaching practice. Increasingly around the world, primary and 
secondary teachers are being subjected to high-stakes evaluation methods, which 
tie the efficacy of their teaching to students' scores on standardised tests.54 Of 
course, this evaluation approach has not yet come into place in higher education, 
                                                                
52 It is beyond the scope of my argument to defend this point here. 
53 Freire, Teachers as cultural workers, 71-72. 
54 “The Good Teacher” study mentioned above, reports that these strict accountability measures 
are contributing to hindering teachers’ good practice (Arthur et al., The Good Teacher, 27-29). 
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but even there, evaluations of teaching on the basis of general categories at the 
end of a course are increasing in popularity. Such evaluations ask students to rank 
the course, e.g. according to whether it enhanced one’s skills and abilities.55 
Looking at the direction of higher education policy in the UK, which will 
implement the Teacher Evaluation Framework (TEF),56 there is strong indication 
that these and other such evaluations of teaching will affect higher education 
hiring and promotion.  
There are at least two problems with these common approaches to teacher 
evaluation. One problem is whether they in fact measure what a student has 
learned. But setting that aside, the more pressing issue for the present discussion is 
that these methods evaluate teaching on the basis of its relation to the ends or 
results of a student’s learning process. So what is the problem? Shouldn't we say 
that to some extent teaching has to guarantee certain learning outcomes, if it is to 
be called teaching at all?  
This brings us to what I call the “hard problem of teacher evaluation” (a 
loose analogy to Chalmers’ “hard problem of consciousness”). As mentioned, a 
common way to evaluate teaching is to look at it from narrowly defined ends, 
specifically from the positive outcomes it “produced” in the learner. We could say 
that if we just used better measures of student learning, e.g. more complex 
evaluations of critical thinking, and other assessments of student thinking and 
understanding at the end of a lesson or course, then this would “solve” the hard 
problem and give an accurate evaluation of whether the teaching was in fact good. 
But such evaluations involve inferences and these are necessarily limited; students’ 
lack of understanding in a subject area does not necessarily mean that it was a 
result of bad teaching, just as students’ increased understanding does not 
necessarily mean that it was the result of good teaching.57  
                                                                
55 This question was put forward as part of a higher education teacher evaluation system called 
Evasys. 
56 On this framework see DBIS, Teaching Excellence Framework: Technical Consultation for 
Year Two (London: Department for Innovation, Business and Schools, 2016). 
57 As one math study shows in what it calls “the learning miracle”, students of teachers who 
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Panhuizen, “The Learning Paradox and the Learning Miracle. Thoughts on Primary School 
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As discussed, teaching in the strong sense necessarily links to learners' 
processes of experience and thinking, especially to their experience of limitation 
and their inquiry into that limitation that takes place in time through embodied 
interactions with subject matter, teacher and peers. What makes teaching teaching 
is the very ways a teacher links to these processes in the situations that they occur. 
Thus evaluating teaching from the end of a process—really a collection of 
processes that involve complex interactions and relations with oneself and 
others—is necessarily limited. This approach overlooks the process of teaching 
that, as I have shown, involves self-reflection on limitations, self-questioning, 
responsiveness, listening and associated virtues of the teacher—indispensable 
features that are more difficult to observe and measure. The hard problem of 
teaching evaluation is then the problem of evaluating the process of teaching, a 
process that is in a certain sense invisible while a teacher is teaching, and in a 
certain sense erased once the learner has learned. It is invisible because much of 
what counts in the kinds of teaching that promote transformative learning and 
understanding is in the teacher’s own thinking processes that lead her to make 
certain decisions over others (whether that is in planning stages or in changing 
course during a lesson through the use of practical wisdom). It is erased because, as 
mentioned, the results of learning do not necessarily reveal the path of teaching 
that led to them. They do not reveal the teacher's humility or other essential 
virtues in teaching such as empathy, open-mindedness, and imagination. 
Certainly, I am in favour of complex measurements of student learning that can 
get at students’ ability to think critically and creatively and demonstrate 
understanding. But, if we value virtues in teaching, then we have to also value the 
processes of teaching and how these link to processes of learning.  
To approach this hard problem, we have to have an explicit philosophical 
concept of teaching to guide any empirical evaluation of teaching practice. This 
concept, the indicators used to identify its expression in teaching practice, and 
how these are analysed, must remain open to debate. In this sense, it is a task of 
philosophy of education to squarely face this hard problem.58  
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